Case 338. Translation of the report of the head of the department of intelligence and counterintelligence of Admiral V. Canaris on a trip to Spain from July 22 to 27, 1940 and his meeting with F. Franco regarding the German invasion of Gibraltar.

Brief Summary of Case 338

Case 338 is a report by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris covering negotiations in Spain between 22 and 27 July 1940 regarding the feasibility and planning of a German-Spanish operation against Gibraltar. It records discussions with General Franco, General Vigón, and senior Spanish military officials, together with a preliminary concept for the attack.

Key contents include:

• Discussions on German-Spanish cooperation for an attack on Gibraltar, including intelligence gathering, reconnaissance requirements, artillery deployment, logistics, and joint planning. citeturn10search1
• Spanish officials warned that it would be virtually impossible to conceal preparations because British observers could easily detect troop concentrations, artillery movements, and engineering works around Gibraltar.
• General Vigón emphasized the difficulties posed by terrain, transportation bottlenecks, British observation, and the vulnerability of preparations to British counteraction.
• General Franco expressed support for planning the operation and argued that Gibraltar's reinforced garrison did not make the fortress invulnerable. He believed the main threat would come from British naval forces rather than the garrison itself.
• Considerable attention was given to coastal artillery, air support, fighter cover, naval threats, and the possibility of British intervention from the sea.
• The report contains detailed reconnaissance findings from visits to La Línea, Algeciras, Punta Carnero, and several Spanish airfields, together with instructions for further intelligence collection.
• A comprehensive assessment of the difficulties of attacking Gibraltar is provided, including British fortifications, restricted avenues of attack, observation advantages, and uncertainty regarding the reaction of the Royal Navy.
• The document outlines a proposed attack sequence involving:

• artillery bombardment,
• air strikes by dive-bombers,
• attacks against tunnel entrances, batteries, and defensive positions,
• engineer assaults,
• mountain infantry advances toward the Moorish Castle and other key objectives.

• Detailed force requirements are listed, including large numbers of heavy artillery batteries, anti-aircraft guns used in a ground-fire role, engineer assault units, mountain infantry, Brandenburg commandos, communications units, and Luftwaffe formations.
• The report concludes with a list of measures expected from Spain, including road construction, airfield preparation, ammunition stockpiling, communications improvements, evacuation of areas near Gibraltar, and security arrangements for the operational zone.

Overall, the file is an early strategic planning document that evaluates the feasibility of attacking Gibraltar, records German negotiations with Spain, and presents a preliminary concept of operations, required forces, and supporting preparations for what later became Operation Felix.